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Abstract:   Hyman Minsky can readily be categorized as a post-Keynesian 
economist, for he advances a purist’s interpretation of John Maynard Keynes’ The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Through employing a 
rigorous Keynesian framework, Minsky developed an enduring contribution to the 
literature bearing the title: “The Financial Instability Hypothesis” (1992), that 
appears as Working Paper No. 74 at the Jerome Levi Institute. In this document 
Minsky considered forces and variables that induce financial instability—that are 
also specific to advanced capitalist economies. He challenges the classical 
economists and the notion that a general equilibrium will prevail. Instead, Minsky 
goes on to teach us that the actions of businesses, banks and government, working 
hand-in-hand, serve to perpetuate cyclical, financial instability—defined by 
inflationary and deflationary periods. 
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This inquiry seeks to convince the reader that in his Working Paper No. 74 
prepared for the Jerome Levy Institute, and that is entitled “The Financial 
Instability Hypothesis”, Hyman Minsky considers forces and variables that 
generate cycles in advanced capitalist economies. Minsky teaches us that capitalist 
economies typically display cycles that are characterized by periods of inflation 
that are followed by painful, deflationary periods. Minsky’s hypothesis of these 
ongoing cycles challenges notions of a self-sustaining general equilibrium 
advanced by Léon Walras, in particular. I shall begin this inquiry by emphasizing 
Minsky’s scholarly appreciation of John Maynard Keynes’s contributions found in 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [1936]. Second, I shall 
focus upon Minsky’s regarding how it is that financial crises unfold. Third, I shall 





Minsky’s Keynesian framework 
Minsky defines himself as a post-Keynesian in the proposer sense, and this means 
through offering specific references and quotes borrowed from the text of Keynes’  
General Theory. Minsky (1992, 1) emphasizes that his financial instability 
hypothesis can be seen as “… an interpretation of the substance of Keynes’s 
‘General Theory’” (1992, 1), but so of adoration of Keynes is riddled throughout 
all of Minsky’s scholarly writings. To better understand the financial instability 
hypothesis, it is imperative to understand the Keynesian foundation upon which 
Minsky built his hypothesis. In the preface to his Stabilizing an Unstable Economy 
(1986), Minsky (1986, xiv) mentions that although his work can be described as 
“post-Keynesian”, he uses Keynes’s work as the shoulders of a giant, upon which 
he can stand and which helps him to see further and more clearly, and not as 
simply dependent on the works of  the “Great Man”. 
In reading his book, John Maynard Keynes, Minsky (1975, 7) teaches us that 
Keynes studied at Cambridge University, and was neither a traditionalist nor a 
Marxist. Minsky (1975, 7) then describes Keynes as one who was on the “left,” but 
was not extreme and he his positions tended to reflect his appreciation for the 
middle ground. During the Great Depression, many classical economists were 
scrambling to explain the economic downturn as a result of weak regulation in the 
financial system, as well as errors which were avoidable with proper policy 
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prescriptions. In the view of Minsky (1975, 6), the most prominent among these 
economists was Henry Calvert Simons of the University of Chicago, whose view 
was that the Great Depression did not register as a systemic flaw arising within the 
capitalist system. Minsky (1975, 8) states that, to the contrary, Keynes correctly 
pointed out that the Great Depression was indeed a symptom of the inherent flaws 
in the capitalist system. Keynes went so far as to argue that nothing could be done 
to avoid cyclical depressions in a capitalist economy, and only good policy could 
help to control these depressionary periods. According to Minsky (1975, 6), the 
economists were failing to address the root cause of the depression, namely, the 
system itself. 
  It was during the seventh year of the Great Depression, in February 1936, 
that Keynes had published his magnum opus, General Theory. Keynes’ book 
endeavors to clarify the cyclical nature of an advanced capitalist economy, and also 
to note realistic policy prescriptions and analytical tools that could be used to 
address the issues arising with these cycles. The crux of the cyclical and unstable 
character found in an advanced capitalist economy, according to Keynes, can be 
traced to the instability of investment. Minsky (1975, 61) understood that Keynes 
believed that the classical theory of equilibrium was not attainable in the way many 
classical economists had theorized. Keynes thought of long-run equilibrium as a 
moving target, which if ever achieved, would be for but for a short moment. From 
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Minsky’s (1975, 68) writings we know that in Keynes’ view, each short-term 
equilibrium should be understood as a transitory moment. Keynes’s view can be 
best explained by noting that forces generate a tendency towards equilibrium, but 
equilibrium is never actually achieved. According to Minsky (1975, 20), Keynes’s 
work quickly caught on and became popular, and many economists welcomed 
some of his innovations, such as the consumption function, while truncating others, 
such as uncertainty in decision-making. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis 
should be seen as an extension of Keynes’ efforts to deal with this subject of 
uncertainty.  
Minsky (1975, 66) specifies that many of the economists that interpreted The 
General Theory tended to trivialize Keynes’s ideas regarding uncertainty, thereby 
missing what proves essential for understanding this book. In the views of Keynes 
and also Minsky, uncertainty proves fundamental to the modern capitalist 
economy. More specifically, uncertainty appears when cash is transferred from 
depositors to banks, which then lend to businesspeople undertaking investments. 
The transfer of cash from one to another is founded upon the expectation that the 
cash will be returned with repayments of the original principal plus interest. In 
other words, Minsky (1975, 77) purports that the financial portfolios held by 
institutions and firms in an advanced capitalist economy are axiomatically 
speculative in nature. In the capitalist economy, as the businesses purchase capital 
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assets with borrowed cash, the borrowing can be referred to as a “liability”, that is, 
the business becomes indebted and must pay back the original amount at some 
specified point in the future. Minsky (1975, 89) goes on to explain that managers 
of the business believe they will be able to fulfill the liability commitment because 
it is speculating that its investments in capital assets will indeed produce sufficient 
cash flow to pay off the liability and also produce value in excess of the liability. 
The imperative of accounting for uncertainty in economic analysis should be 
seen as the Keynesian view that Minsky emphasizes. If the speculation of a 
business materializes, then its stock will appreciate in value and the businesspeople 
will have achieved their goal of producing excess value. At the aggregate level, the 
stock markets will appreciate, and businesspeople will continue to play “the mixed 
game” where skill and luck determine successful speculation. As the market value 
of businesses continues to rise, bankers will gladly issue more debt because the 
businesses should be able to fulfill their liability commitments.   
It is based upon this Keynesian framework that Hyman Minsky developed 
his Financial Instability Hypothesis. Without the shoulders of the intellectual giant 
Keynes to stand upon, it is unclear whether Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis would have been presented so brilliantly. Keynes’ influence on 
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Minsky’s thinking is clear and his reliance on Keynes’ writings paved the way for 
a penetrating understanding of the capitalist economy.   
 
How Crises Unfold 
Like Keynes, Minsky believed the modern capitalist, economic system to be 
inherently unstable. The free-market forces can prove destabilizing by their very 
nature, and so must be steered, constrained and stabilized, even if for a transient 
moment. In the modern capitalist economy, government interventions intended to 
induce stability tend to prove short-lived because the downside protection 
encourages borrowers and lenders to take on additional risk-taking activities to 
achieve profits.  In Keynes, Minsky (1975, 162) explains that as these risk-taking 
activities produce profits, the margin of safety borrowers and lenders require will 
decrease, and the entire system will gradually become more risk prone. So, it can 
be said that crises are formed in an advanced capitalist economy by both inherent 
flaws in the system in combination with governmental interventions that intend to 
keep the economy stable. 
A crucial piece of the advanced capitalist economy is that it has a 
sophisticated financial system. The financial system is composed of commercial 
banks, investment banks, and many other financial intermediaries that mark the 
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capitalist economy (Minsky, 1992, 3). As mentioned in The Financial Instability 
Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 6) understands that banks are highly leveraged and 
transfer the cash they receive from their depositors to businesses, with the 
expectation they will receive a profitable cash flow in the future. Minsky (1986, 
229) further clarifies in Chapter 10 of Stabilizing an Unstable Economy that the 
fundamental premise of the business of banking in an advanced capitalist society is 
the goal of profit maximization.  
Reconsidering Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky (1986, 238) 
explores the idea of bank management motivation. Institutional bank executives 
are paid mainly in stock options, which can appreciate significantly if the banks 
share prices increases. So, executives are motivated to increase the market value of 
their shares because it will make them wealthy. Minsky (1986, 238) states that by 
emphasizing growth, banks will inherently increase their financial leverage by 
taking on more debt—which makes the financial system and economy more 
unstable. These banks, which can be described as economic units, take on risk in 
the hope of profit. In The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 6) states 
that for all economic units, whether firms or individuals, there exist three distinct 
income-debt relations that explain how financial crises arise. He notes these as 
hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance.  
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Hedge financing units are deemed the safest and most stable among all 
income-debt relations. Hedge financing units are those whose projected cash flows 
are expected to cover interest and principle payments on debt. For example, a 
hedge-financing unit could be observed when a business borrows cash to purchase 
capital equipment for use in manufacturing, with a strong expectation that the cash 
flow from the project would indeed prove sufficient to service the debt obligations. 
In The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 7) states that the more 
significant the proportion of equity financing, that is stock financing, in the 
company’s capital structure, the more likely the unit is a hedge financing unit. If all 
financing units in a capitalist economic system were hedge-financing units, the 
margin of safety for borrowers and lenders would be relatively high. Minsky 
(1992, 7) goes on to explain that a high margin of safety with hedge financing units 
could mean that there is a possibility that the economy would be a self-sustaining 
and equilibrium seeking system. However, as Minsky and Keynes have pointed 
out, empirically that such a system is typically not the case. 
Instead of an equilibrium seeking and self-containing economic system (as 
classical economists tout), Minsky (1992, 7) explains that we are more likely to  
see a “deviation amplifying system”; whereby borrowers and lenders turn to 
higher-risk activities in search of greater profits. Minsky (1992, 7) terms these as 
“speculative financing units”, and can be defined by their cash flows proving 
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sufficient for covering mandatory interest payments. As explained by Randall 
Wray (2016, 79) in Why Minsky Matters, speculative finance units currently do not 
produce sufficient cash flows to cover principle payments, but they are expected to 
rise sufficiently in the future to do so. A riskier profile than hedge-financing units, 
speculative financing units should be seen as the natural extension of hedge units 
because the longer the period of stability, the more desperate the economic units 
seek out profits.  
The third and most risky profile of which Minsky warned is Ponzi finance. 
Minsky (1992, 7) explains that Ponzi financing units are those with cash flows that 
prove neither sufficient to cover interest payments nor principle. Unless Ponzi 
units sell their assets or borrow additional capital to sustain themselves, they are 
unstable and cannot succeed in the long run. Minsky (1992, 7) warns us that an 
economic unit that adopts the Ponzi financing unit reduces the margin of safety its 
creditors hold. Again, in Why Minsky Matters, Wray (2016, 79) goes further to 
explains that a Ponzi unit borrows capital to pay its mandatory interest payments. 
As described above, hedge financing registers as the only financing unit in 
which the capitalist economy may be an equilibrium seeking and containing 
system. Minsky (1992, 7) teaches us that when economic units inevitably leave 
hedge financing for the two other units (speculative and Ponzi financing), they are 
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likely to make the economy a deviation amplifying system. Minsky (1992, 4) adds 
that each financing unit may last for a time, but eventually the skill and luck of 
businesspeople will run out, and their pro forma statements will not materialize. 
This is the point in time when a crisis occurs. Minsky (1992, 8) stresses that a 
critical component to understanding the financial instability hypothesis is that the 
economy is stable under certain financing regimes and unstable under others. 
Minsky (1992, 8) mentions that another axiom of the financial instability 
hypothesis is that the capitalist economy will transition to different income-debt 
relations over periods of prosperity, turning from stable to unstable. 
 Through real-time, the economy will experience growth and prosperity and 
this part of the cycle allows businesspeople to profit from their hedge financing 
units. Minsky (1992, 7) makes it clear: as the good times and profits continue, 
businesspeople will tend to become bolder and move to speculative units, and 
eventually, they will succumb to Ponzi finance. Minsky (1992, 8) goes on to teach 
us that predictably, the low margin of safety offered by Ponzi financing units and 
the inability to service debt payments with cash flows will cause the businesses to 





Minsky on Financial Cycles 
Minsky (1992, 1) stresses that his financial instability hypothesis has both 
empirical and theoretical aspects. As noted above, Keynes’ General Theory 
explained that the Great Depression was not the wrongdoing of any specific actors; 
rather, the deep and enduring downturn was but a reality which sophisticated 
capitalist economies tend to suffer, though there are mechanisms that can be 
implemented to lessen the damage. Historical episodes of expansion and 
contraction, which continually occur in modern capitalist economies, are empirical 
evidence supporting Minsky’s hypothesis. The theoretical aspects of the financial 
instability hypothesis begin with the modern capitalist economy, which has capital 
assets and a sophisticated financial system ripe with financial intermediaries. 
Minsky (1992, 1) states that there are two main periods in a modern 
capitalist economy: stable periods and unstable periods. When the times are stable, 
real income tends to be rising, employment increasing, and there is a prevailing 
sense of general optimism about the economy and future growth. During unstable 
times, there are painful economic contractions wherein unemployment runs 
rampant, and there is a negative outlook on the future of the economy. The cyclical 
nature of the economy supports Minsky’s understanding that indeed there is no 
“invisible hand” as Adam Smith and most modern economists proclaim. Minsky’s 
view is that the dynamics of the capitalist economy prove destabilizing. As Wray 
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(2016, 16) clearly points out, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis argues that 
even when times are stable, such stability will encourage risk taking and fiscal and 
monetary policy tightening, leading to a fragile and unstable economy. 
We can understand the financial cycles that Minsky knew to be an innate 
characteristic of the modern capitalist economy by further examining Minsky’s 
Levy Institute Working Paper. On the last page of this paper, Minsky (1992, 8) 
teaches us that when the central bank uses its monetary policy tools to constrain 
the money supply, the intervention only encourages more risk-taking behavior and 
turns formerly speculative finance units into Ponzi units. Then we need to consider 
that these Ponzi units are even more unstable than the speculative units, and can 
exacerbate a future recession by collapsing asset values. Minsky understood that 
stability turns to fragility, time and again, and this tendency proves integral to the 









This inquiry has sought to establish that in his The Financial Instability 
Hypothesis, Hyman Minsky considered the forces and variables that induce 
financial instability. We can see that Minsky thought of financial instability as an 
feature inherent to the advanced capitalist economy—a sort of unavoidable evil in 
the system. While this short inquiry has not meant to offer an all-encompassing 
analysis of the sources that might cause financial instability in the advanced 
capitalist economy, it is sufficient to understand the forces and variables that 
Minsky discussed in The Financial Instability Hypothesis. During times of 
prosperity, economic units see great profits and success with comfortable margins 
of safety through using hedging units, prompting them to take on additional risk. 
Interventions by the federal government might also contribute to the risk-taking 
behavior of economic units by limiting the downsides through protections. The 
hedge units’ transition to riskier speculative units which then graduate to unstable 
and very risky Ponzi units.  
 A question to ponder upon reading this inquiry is “What do we all make of 
this?” Should the people accept that our current system will have good times and 
bad times, with increasingly painful bad times and shorter good times, or should 
we do something to change the system? After all, the capitalist system has had a 
long run in the United States and in other countries, yet the neo-classical 
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economists continue to affirm that the free-market system will correct itself. In 
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky (1986, 287) explains that it appears 
current leaders and advisers in modern capitalist economies do not seem to be 
aware that the day-to-day functioning of the economy leads to financial crises and 
all sorts of economic woes. Perhaps there is a need for a new system, or a hefty 
reform of the modern capitalist system that Minsky has clearly shown tends 
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